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THE SECOND COMING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Introduction

The European world of 1815-1914 has returned in the global world of 1945-1974. The five major powers of the pre-World War I era: Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, and France, have to a considerable extent resurrected themselves in the major powers of the pre-World War III era: the Soviet Union, Maoist China, the United States, East Germany, and modern France respectively.

Although striking differences of ideology exist between the two German and French nations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while even more profound differences separate Austria from the USSR and Czarism from Maoism; the mechanical principles of policy and operation between the two groups of powers are in many compelling instances similar. Major discrepancies exist within these limits, but are compensated for in other ways, which possibly make 1974 as logical a time for the outbreak of World War III as was 1914 for the eruption of World War I.

I

THE FIVE POWERS

A. Austria-Hungary and the Soviet Union

A comparison of the medieval Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Marxist USSR may appear difficult until one examines the mechanical structure and policies of each state.

The Hapsburg Empire of 1815-1914 was a multinational agrarian state in which a feudal tenant-landlord system supported an economic elite, the Magyars of Hungary. An administrative bureaucracy reserved to the Germans of Austria provided the latter with exclusive political control, until a compromise of 1867 extended political equality to the Magyars as well.

Because social mobility was circumscribed by nationality of birth, efforts toward national self-determination by the disenfranchised Slav masses were opposed. Yet within the ruling aristocracy existed the national division between the Magyars and the Austrians, a division compounded by political disagreement: the Magyars were reactionary while the Austrians tended to be more politically pragmatic. Consequently, the transnational authority of the Hapsburg monarchy was necessary to hold together the elite, and thus the Empire as a whole. Because imperial unity depended ultimately upon dynasty instead of nationality, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in principle a universal state.

But this constitution of dynasty and universality was opposed to the forces of liberalism and nationalism released in Europe by the French Revolution. To preserve its system after the Napoleonic defeat of 1815, the Austrians organized a coalition of dynastic states which, although failing to impose the single universal dynasty upon Europe which the Hapsburgs had attempted during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, successfully reestablished the universality of dynastic government on the continent which existed prior to 1789.

Dynastic Europe was shaken, however, by national and liberal revolts which culminated in the revolutions of 1848. Although Austrian hegemony was subsequently restored within the Empire and in Germany and Italy, the long-term decline of the Empire continued, aggravated by the desertion of Czarist Russia. This desertion, provoked by Austria when it refused to side with Russia during the Crimean war, became an open split

when the Russians permitted the unification of Germany by Prussia in 1866 and 1871. Thereafter, the Hapsburg Empire became increasingly defensive against not only the forces of liberalism and nationalism, but also against the growing threat of a rival dynasty to the east.

Unlike the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which considered itself the bastion of the old order, the Soviet Union of 1945-1974 considers itself the vanguard of the future. Where Austria was a precapitalist amalgamation of distinct agrarian peasant groups subject to the aristocracy of two supreme groups, themselves subordinate to the autocracy of a single person; the Soviet Union is by contrast a supposedly postcapitalist mass of anonymous industrial proletarians subject to the dictatorship of a supremely anonymous force, the state, over which no single personality since Stalin has exercised control.

Yet both states evidence an equivalent pattern of authoritarianism. Subordination of nationalism was essential to Austria and is essential to the multinational USSR. While Austria segregated its peoples to achieve control, the Soviets have tried to suppress nationalism through the creation of a fusion "Soviet" nationality.

Soviet socialism preserves a ruling elite of bureaucrats just as aristocracy supported the power of the Austro-Hungarian elite. Although advancement in the USSR is open to all, success depends upon a willingness to subordinate individual initiative to the decisions of higher authority. Divisions exist within the senior levels of the Soviet bureaucracy between reactionary party doctrinaires and more pragmatic technocrats, but these are overcome (or at least concealed) by the official unanimity of the Communist Party. Because Communist discipline extends to national as well as bureaucratic differences, the USSR is in principle a universal state.

Although unable to impose its system of universal bureaucracy on the world after the Axis defeat of 1945, the USSR has successfully organized a coalition of Communist dictatorships in Europe. However, Soviet Europe has been shaken by liberal and national revolts, and although Soviet hegemony still exists in eastern Europe, the long-term decline of the Soviet Union has continued, aggravated by the desertion of Maoist China. This desertion, first provoked by the USSR when it refused to side with

China during the Korean war, has become an open split since the Chinese denounced the Soviet Union in 1961 and opened relations with the United States a decade later. As a result, the USSR has become increasingly defensive against not only the forces of liberalism and nationalism, but also against the growing threat of a rival Communist dynasty to the east.

B. Czarist Russia and Maoist China

The western powers of the pre-World War I era were increasingly aggressive in their foreign policies and unstable at home, but in both respects exercised sufficient restraint to avoid international war or internal revolution. Domestic class conflict in the west seemed explosive during the first half of the nineteenth century and beyond, but by 1914 most dissatisfied elements had sold out to, or had been coopted by, the established political system.

In foreign affairs, Anglo-French colonial rivalry in Africa nearly precipitated war over the Fashoda incident of 1898, but both sides ultimately retrenched. Anglo-German naval rivalry never estranged Britain from Germany until the eleventh-hour failure of the Haldane mission to Berlin of 1911. Franco-German rivalry over Alsace-Lorraine proved little more than ammunition for domestic politics. Only when the two eastern powers became involved in an all-out conflict in 1914 were the western powers compelled to go to war to preserve the European balance of power.

The two eastern powers of Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia were also aggressive and unstable. But although the Austrian objective to preserve the Balkan status quo was implicitly unrestrained in its aggressiveness to the peoples subject to Hapsburg rule, Austrian foreign policy was extremely cautious after 1871. Although the Austrians ultimately launched the First World War by attacking Serbia, they did so only under extreme provocation, and then sought immediately to contain the conflict.

In contrast to Austria, the Czarist Russia of 1815-1914 was not only aggressive and unstable but, after 1871, explicitly unrestrained as well. Although initially committed to fellow autocracies through the Holy Alliance and the Dreikaiserbund, Czarist policy became progressively subversive and adventuristic. The Balkan crises of 1875-78 and 1885-88, created in part by Czarist subversion, were exploited to extend Russian influence

into the Balkans through support for Slav nationalism. But aside from failing to win the trust of the Balkan Slavs, the Czarist policy severely undermined the integrity and security of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, and debased the Czarist regime by yielding to Russian public opinion. This was disastrous at a time when not only the two Balkan empires but the very concept of autocracy were on the defensive.

Following the brilliant seizure of Manchuria in 1904, ^{the} Czar condoned the reckless subversion of Korea, which provoked a disastrous war with Japan and the Russian revolution of 1905 back home. Finally, by supporting Serbia in 1914, the Czar decisively placed Russian national interests above those of autocracy in general. The ultimate result was internal revolution which destroyed the great autocracies of Europe.

The western powers of the pre-World War III era have also become increasingly unstable in their foreign and domestic problems and policies, but have also demonstrated sufficient restraint to avoid all-out internal or international confrontation. Domestic turmoil seemed explosive in the 1960s but most dissatisfied elements have since been absorbed by the existing political system. In foreign affairs, relations between the western states have become progressively strained but remain essentially stable.

The two eastern powers of the Soviet Union and Maoist China are also unstable. Soviet foreign policy has been occasionally dangerous and generally disruptive, and the minimal Soviet objective has been the preservation of a status quo implicitly aggressive to the peoples subject to Soviet rule. But in every major international crisis since 1945, the USSR has restrained itself from direct warfare with other powers.

By contrast to the Soviet Union, the Maoist China of 1949-1974 has pursued a cautious foreign policy but a generally unrestrained and violent domestic program, which with the advent of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, could be translated into an unrestrained foreign policy, especially toward China's rival Communist empire, the Soviet Union.

After a period of consolidation during the early 1950s, the Maoists launched the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59, which collapsed in economic anarchy by the early 1960s, but was accompanied by intense anti-Americanism. After a brief period of recovery, the Maoists began a second internal

upheaval, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1965-68, which wrought havoc on the political and military as well as economic stability of China, and for a short time propelled violent and fanatical revolutionaries into positions of considerable power. Concurrent with this second upheaval was a virulent propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union as well as the United States.

Familiar portents have appeared in recent months which suggest the possibility of a third internal convulsion in 1974. Renewed turmoil would be especially dangerous with China on the verge of an intercontinental nuclear missile capability, and the propaganda of recent years seems to indicate that Chinese hatred would be directed primarily against the USSR.

Most of the pre-World War I and pre-World War III powers were or are to some extent aggressive and unstable. But those of the west were and are restrained in relation to those of the east. Of the latter, Austria and the USSR were or are implicitly unrestrained, while Czarist Russia and China were or are explicitly so.

C. Great Britain and the United States

Great Britain dominated the Europe of 1815-1871 through the positive example of its liberal and national society, but continued to influence Europe from 1871-1914 by its cynical, balance of power approach to foreign affairs, which despite the restraint mentioned in the previous section, had an unnecessarily negative impact on international stability.

During the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain supplied the backbone of resistance to France. Following the Napoleonic defeat of 1815, the British maintained their leadership by providing the model for liberal economic and political progress on the European continent as a result of their advanced industrial system and parliamentary government.

British techniques made possible the growth of industry on the continent in such major instances as the utilization of coal in iron production, the development of railroads, and the organization of complex banking and financial institutions. The British system of parliamentary government was copied in some form by all of the existing and emerging states of Europe; even the autocracies of Austria and Russia eventually adopted token constitutions and parliaments. As a result of this leadership, Great

Britain enjoyed a preeminence in the decades which followed 1815, despite the aloof British policy of "splendid isolation".

But the downfall of Napoleon III in 1870 and the unifications of Germany and Italy in 1871 marked the general triumph of nationalism and, with the major exception of Germany, liberalism in western Europe. After 1871, the bipolar struggle between dynastic autocracy led by Austria and liberal nationalism led implicitly by Great Britain gave way to a new multipolar struggle along national or nationalistic lines. Former ideological adversaries became allies in the search for a new equilibrium as Prussian Germany allied itself to Hapsburg Austria, and Republican France joined together with Czarist Russia.

Paradoxically, this establishment of liberalism and/or nationalism was a decisive blow to Great Britain. Unchallenged by the continent since 1815, the British found their prestige and security threatened after 1871 by the explosive growth of German power, and by the colonial ambitions of France and Russia. Yet instead of committing itself to an alliance, Great Britain responded to the continental challenge by playing off the other powers to British advantage from 1871-1914.

After supporting France during the war scare with Germany of 1875, the British fiercely opposed French colonial expansion in Africa until the near confrontation of 1898. British hostility to France was reversed in 1904 to counter the German naval threat, but the British remained neutral in World War I until the German invasion of Belgium, which revised the balance of power against France and thereby compelled British intervention.

Although unable to follow a consistent foreign policy because of unavoidable shifts in their parliamentary balance, the British could have made a general commitment to an ally, as did parliamentary France to Russia. But the British, less immediately threatened than France, preferred a policy of independence, which unlike the occasional treachery practiced by everyone, was carried to a degree of systematic duplicity which diminished the stability of alliances and shattered the residual bonds of ideological and sentimental loyalty between powers.

The United States of America has dominated the world of 1945-1974 by the positive example of America's advanced technology and democratic poli-

tical system. The USA has continued to influence world affairs from 1971-1974, however, through a cynical realpolitik approach to foreign policy. This approach has had an unnecessarily negative impact on international stability, as did British policy a century before.

The United States provided the backbone of western resistance to the Axis powers during World War II, and after the Axis defeat of 1945, supplied the model for democratic economic and political development. The application of American techniques and resources made possible the recovery and emergence of western Europe and Japan as economic power centers second only to the USA and the USSR. The political institutions of nearly every emerging nation since 1945 have been patterned after the American model; even the dictatorships of the Soviet Union (in 1936) and Maoist China felt obliged to adopt token democratic institutions. As a result of this leadership, the United States enjoyed a preeminent position in the two decades which followed 1945.

But by 1971, the economic resurgence of Europe and Japan coupled with the Sino-Soviet split shattered the post-World War II bipolar ideological struggle between the Communist and non-Communist blocs, under USSR and USA leadership respectively. A new, multipolar struggle emerged along national or nationalistic lines. This change removed the basis for American pre-eminence within the non-Communist bloc, but instead of committing itself to one of the two emerging alliances described in subsequent sections: the German-Soviet or Franco-Chinese; the United States has played off the rival powers of 1971-1974 to American advantage.

Politically exhausted by the war in Vietnam, which played into the hands of the otherwise bitterly divided Soviets and Chinese; and jeopardized by the economic competition of Europe and Japan; the USA abandoned its political and economic idealism. An initiative toward Maoist China aggravated the Sino-Soviet rift and led to the disengagement of US forces from Vietnam on American terms, while superpower pressure against western Europe and Japan prevented an imminent American financial collapse.

Although this pragmatism has served the short-term American interest, it has disrupted the long-term cohesion of the western bloc, severely reduced the residual bonds of sentimental and ideological affinity between powers, and most importantly, deepened the triangular distrust between the United States, the USSR, and China.

D. Prussia and East Germany

Following the liberation from Napoleon of 1814-15, the states of Germany moved into two opposing camps, one led by the militaristic Prussians in the east and the other comprised of the more materialistic Rhine Germans in the west (with a third Catholic subgroup to the south opposed to both). Both the Prussians and Rhine Germans advocated national unity but were prevented from achieving it by the Austrian Empire, until the sudden Prussian defeat of Austria in 1866 and the Prussian victory over France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, which resulted in the unification of Germany under Prussian domination.

The new Germany underwent massive industrial expansion in the subsequent decades but at the same time grew increasingly nationalist and militaristic despite progressive ("socialist") internal reforms. The German Empire supported the decrepit Austro-Hungarian Empire against its mounting difficulties after 1871, and to a limited but significant extent slowly dominated the Hapsburg state.

Following World War II, Germany was divided into two zones within which arose two German states: a materialistic Rhine German state in the west, and a Prussianistic Communist state in the east. Both the East and West Germans have advocated national reunification but have been prevented from achieving it by the Soviet Union. However, the West German state is increasingly dominated by hard-core Marxists and Communists who may independently achieve Communism in West Germany. Should this occur, it will be difficult for the Soviets to oppose German reunification on ideological grounds, and should Communist East and West German armed forces join together to confront the Soviets with a bloodless fait accompli, it will be difficult for the Soviets to challenge Germany without risking a two-front war in Europe and the Far East (China is likely to support a reunified Germany for the same reasons Czarist Russia supported German unification in 1871).

A Communist Germany under Prussianistic East German leadership will probably continue the present East German policies of Prussian socialism mixed with Prussian discipline, but in the absence of Soviet domination, may emphasize the more traditional aspects as it is discreetly doing today.

The new Germany may lend support to the decrepit Soviet Union against the mounting difficulties of the latter, as West Germany already does today through detente. This may in turn develop into collaboration if the initial fears of each other by the Germans and Soviets fade as did the mutual apprehension between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. German domination of the Soviet Union will then become a distant possibility. For although Austria remained independent and powerful after 1871, internal stress coupled with the expanding threat of pan-Slavism and Russia eroded the Hapsburg position and caused the Austro-Hungarian regime to depend to upon Germany and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain for political support. The Soviet Union is liable to remain more powerful than Austria a century before, but equally corrosive internal stress described in a later section together with pressure from Maoist China have already made the USSR somewhat dependent upon Germany and, to a lesser extent, the United States for political support.

The Prussian trend in the Germany of 1815-1914 may not be fulfilled in a Prussianistic Communist Germany by 1974, but the preliminary stages of the latter are in progress and may be fulfilled at a later date.

E. France: 1871 and 1971

The France of 1815-1914 underwent three major periods of development. The first, from 1815-1848, was dominated by an unsuccessful effort to establish a constitutional monarchy, and culminated in a coup d'etat by Napoleon III. Napoleon began the second period with the organization of a powerful monarchy within the token framework of constitutional process. Under Napoleon III, France achieved major economic development but at the cost of vainglorious adventurism in foreign affairs, which ultimately toppled Napoleon and ushered in a brief Communist insurgency (the Paris Commune of 1871). The third and final period of nineteenth century France began with the organization of the Third Republic in 1871. Under this regime, France settled down to a period of relative stability despite fierce rivalry with Great Britain. This rivalry diminished, however, as German power increased, and caused France to develop an alliance with Czarist Russia to offset the Austro-German combination.

The France of 1945-1974 has also undergone three major periods of development. The first period from 1945-1958 unsuccessfully attempted to

establish a parliamentary government with a Presidency reduced to the role of a figurehead, and culminated in a defacto coup d'etat by Charles de Gaulle, who began the second period with the establishment of a strong Presidency within a reduced framework of constitutional process. Under De Gaulle, France achieved significant economic expansion but at the cost of a vainglorious foreign policy, which helped to undermine DeGaulle's position and led to his downfall after a brief Communist insurgency (the Paris revolt of 1968).

The third and final period of post-World War II France began with the accession of Georges Pompidou as President in 1969. Under this regime, France has settled down to a period of relative stability despite intense rivalry with the United States. This rivalry may diminish, however, if Germany should unify under a Communist regime. The French have already developed an entente with Maoist China to offset the increasing ties between West Germany and the Soviet Union.

II

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1914 AND 1974

A. The Soviet Ausgleich of 1971

Although it contained the revolutions of 1848, tensions within the Austrian Empire remained. Slav nationalism smoldered beneath the surface, while the discontent of the disenfranchised Magyars grew. With the defeat of Austria in 1866, the Magyars rose in opposition and threatened to split the Empire. A compromise was therefore reached in 1867 in which the Magyars received political equality with Austria and control of internal affairs, while the Austrians retained a free hand in foreign policy.

The problems of the Empire, chiefly Slav nationalism, worsened as the reactionary Magyars consolidated their power in the decades after 1867. Unable (and unwilling) to effect internal change, the more pragmatic Austrians turned to the western powers of Germany and Great Britain for political support, which both powers provided: Germany through the Dual Alliance, and Britain through the Mediterranean Agreements to preserve the status quo of the Near East. But with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the pressure of Czarist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian position became critical.

Although successful in suppressing liberal and national revolt, tensions within the Soviet Union and its bloc remained. The problems of the Soviet system, mainly an inefficient agricultural sector and technological retardation, finally reached crisis proportions by 1970, and the conflict between party reactionaries displaced by "de-Stalinization" and the ruling technocrats surfaced. A compromise was therefore reached in 1971 in which the party doctrinaires achieved control over Soviet internal affairs but gave the technocrats a free hand in foreign policy.

Conditions within the Soviet Union are liable to worsen in the years after 1971 as the party reactionaries consolidate their power. Soviet internal problems, caused by the overcentralization and suppression of initiative necessary to preserve the Soviet dictatorship, can only be aggravated by the continuation of collectivized agriculture and central planning. This will increasingly endanger the USSR to ~~the~~ spontaneous revolution of the type which swept Poland in 1970 in reaction to simple food shortages.

Unable (and mostly unwilling) to effect internal reform, the Soviet technocrats have turned to the western powers of West Germany and the

United States for political and technological support. The West Germans have provided the former through "detente" while American businessmen seem eager to export food and technology to the USSR. However, in the absence of internal reform and with the growing pressure of Maoist China, the Soviet position is likely to remain critical.

B. The Czar's Nuclear Arsenal

Czarist Russia was the largest underdeveloped country in the Europe of 1815-1914. Its great masses of peasants comprised a tremendous potential for economic development and military power. Czarist policies of dynastic expansion threatened Austria and the west but even more threatening was the specter of such expansion executed with the technology of the industrial age.

The industrialization of Czarist Russia accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth century. With the completion of the Trans-Siberian railroad in 1904, the Czar felt strong enough to challenge a second-rate industrial power in the Far East, Japan. The challenge, reckless to begin with, backfired because the Russians were unable to deploy their warships and railroads efficiently. As a result of this, and of subsequent unpreparedness during the Bosnian crisis of 1908 described in the next section, reforms were enacted to upgrade the efficiency of the Russian army along western lines. These reforms were scheduled for completion in 1917, but were interrupted by the outbreak of World War I.

Maoist China is the largest underdeveloped country in the world of 1945-1974. Its teeming millions of peasants form a gigantic potential for economic development and military power. Maoist policies of violent fanaticism are a major threat to the Soviet Union and the west with the development of a Chinese nuclear capability.

Chinese nuclear development has accelerated in recent years and China is expected to possess intercontinental missiles between 1975 and 1980. Such weapons will enable Chairman Mao to endanger the USSR and the west unless preemptive action is taken.

C. The War to End All Wars No. 3

Various pressures in the modern world: Soviet internal stress, Chinese fanaticism, American duplicity, the possibility of a Prussianistic Germany, and an insecure France; have combined to create an international environment similar in many respects to that which preceded the first world war in Europe.

The trigger of World War I, the instability of the Balkans, is also present today in the instability of the modern Middle East. Two great powers, although not the same ones as in 1914, have committed themselves to irreconcilable local interests in the Middle East of 1974, as did Austria and Czarist Russia in the Balkans of 1914. Although neither of the two powers of 1914 desired a direct confrontation with the other, neither was prepared to accept diplomatic defeat, and in the end, both went to war.

The end of the pre-World War I era began in 1908 when Austria annexed the former Turkish province of Bosnia to prevent its acquisition by the Slav nationalist state of Serbia. Unable to challenge Austria, which betrayed a promise to support Russian naval penetration of the Mediterranean in return for Russian approval of the Bosnian action, the Russians were forced to accede to the Austrian move, which temporarily contained Slav nationalism and was perceived as a major diplomatic setback for Czarism.

The renewed outbreak of Balkan conflict which attended the breakup of the European Turkish Empire in 1912 was exploited by Czarist Russia to advance Slav interests in opposition to Austria, which sought again to arrest them. Although the Balkan warfare of 1912-1914 was interrupted by numerous ceasefires and partitions, nothing resolved the basic antagonism between Hapsburg rule and Slavism. Great power involvement deepened until ~~the~~ 1914, when the assassination of the Hapsburg heir on top of everything else finally provoked an Austrian attack on Serbia. The Czar, unwilling to accept a second diplomatic defeat, reluctantly mobilized against Austria and set in motion the chain of mobilizations which initiated the first world war.

Although the United States and Soviet Union instead of China and the Soviet Union are involved in the Middle East, and on the wrong sides, to make analogy with 1914 congruent, the implications of Soviet hegemony in the Middle East are just as threatening to Maoist China as were the impli-

cations of Austrian hegemony in the Balkans. And although a Soviet-American clash in the Middle East may initiate World War III, China is almost certain to be drawn into the conflict, along with Germany and France.

The end of the pre-World War III era began in 1968, when the Soviets launched a preemptive attack on Czechoslovakia to crush liberalization. This was an implicit blow to the Maoist Chinese, who realized that the same could happen to them. The Cultural Revolution was consequently terminated and frantic military preparations undertaken to absorb a Soviet preemptive attack.

The renewed outbreak of warfare in the Middle East of 1973-74 has not involved China directly, but the outcome will be decisive for the Maoists. The Soviet Union has tried to advance Arab interests in the recent warfare while the United States has sought to balance them with those of Israel. But although the Middle East fighting has been and will be interrupted by ceasefires and partitions, nothing is likely to resolve the basic antagonism between the Arabs and Israelis. Great power involvement has deepened, and one more outbreak of serious fighting could compel great power intervention. If the Soviets and Americans should clash in the Middle East, the Chinese will probably mobilize despite their present nuclear unpreparedness, because a Soviet military victory against the west (or control over the Middle East oil fields vital to the western economies) would decisively threaten China.

World War I in the west quickly reached a stalemate, but in the east became a conflict between the technology and firepower of the Germans against the manpower and tenacity of the Russians. The Russians were decimated because they were deployed according to conventional western tactics but without the firepower or logistical capability essential to fight a western-style war. The Germans, on the other hand, were able to concentrate their defense in close proximity to German industry and transportation.

A Communist Germany will probably not yet exist in 1974, but the Soviet Union already possesses the ~~technological~~ technological advantage which Germany enjoyed in relation to Czarist Russia. After a Schlieffen-style assault on France and western Europe which the Soviets will probably win, the USSR will launch a preemptive nuclear attack on China if the Chinese have either mobilized or refused to submit to Soviet domination. World War III in the east will then become a conflict between Soviet technology and firepower

against the manpower and tenacity of the Chinese.

The Soviets, however, will probably be decimated. Unlike Czarist policy, Maoist strategy is based upon unconventional guerilla tactics with simple technology and logistical requirements. Although Maoist guerilla strategy demands massive human sacrifice, especially against nuclear weapons, the Chinese are in a position to lose hundreds of millions of casualties and still have sufficient manpower to overwhelm a technologically superior but numerically small enemy in protracted guerilla conflict. The Soviets, on the other hand, will in addition to their relatively limited numbers suffer from extreme overextension from their industry and transportation, which has enough difficulty just meeting the logistical requirements of the Soviet economy in peace.

Despite appalling human losses, the Chinese will probably defeat the Soviet Union in World War III. The USSR will probably ^{then} break up into nation-states as did Austria-Hungary in 1918.

D. World War IV

World War III will probably not destroy the world any more than World War I destroyed Europe; twice as many people died of starvation and disease after the first world war than died of actual hostilities. The danger of World War III is that it will traumatize humanity, and that in the chaotic wartime and postwar conditions, a second Hitler will arise and promise a second "final solution" to all problems. A second Hitler will avoid the errors of the first, and if a dramatic new technology such as lasers should become militarily effective in the hands of such an individual, civilization will once again be threatened by a possibly irresistible totalitarianism. This totalitarianism, armed with the most advanced scientific techniques, will make such previous systems as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union moderate by comparison.

Conclusion

The consequences of World War I may be avoided after the Soviet collapse if the nations of eastern and western Europe (including the European Russian and non-Russian nations of the former USSR) unite in a federation similar to the Articles of Confederation of the early United States of America, with the option of greater unification at a later date. The opportunity to unite in a democratic federation will for the first time in history exist free of national and ideological extremism, although the newly independent nations of eastern Europe will undoubtedly wish to enjoy their independence and will agree to limited unity only to contain Germany and Russia.

The economic system adopted by the nations of Europe could perhaps incorporate industrial democracy with free market operation. Western Europe is already leaning toward increased worker participation in the decision-making process, and of course eastern Europe is striving for freedom from oppressive central control. Such a system would be the logical alternative to the unacceptable present systems based in the west upon free market operation but private ownership and management, and in the east upon collective ownership but bureaucratic operation and central planning.

A post-Soviet Europe could then provide the basis for a world government. But first, the differences which separate America from China and both from Europe will have to be bridged. America and China represent the extremes of private ownership and central control respectively; neither are likely to join the new Europe of their own initiative and may in principle be opposed to each other. However, both China and America will be compelled into some form of bilateral collaboration by the mutual need to contain an independent and possibly hostile Europe. For China and America to subordinate themselves to a world government with Europe may prove a more secure arrangement than competition with Europe and, possibly, each other.

But nations, including those of Europe, may still be unable to organize a world government because of the technicalities involved in agreements between equals, and during the protracted negotiations, public enthusiasm may diminish and revert to apathy. A successful initiative cannot be expected from an international group such as the UN, the leadership and policies of which are debased by their subjection to the conflicting national and ideological interests of the member nations.

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